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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 _______________
No. 04-4244 
________________
RAUL SANTIAGO,
Appellant
v.
     
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 03-cv-04310)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 30, 2005
Before: RENDELL, BARRY and BECKER, Circuit Judges
(Filed:     July 5, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by Raul Santiago from the District Court’s affirmance of the
2decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying disability benefits.  The
question before us, of course, is whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s final decision that Santiago was not disabled under the Social Security
Act through July 23, 2002, the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision
in this case.  Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings
at steps three and four of the sequential evaluation, dealing with the listed impairments
for the musculoskeletal system and with residual functional capacity, we affirm.  Because
the parties are fully familiar with the background facts and procedural history we need not
set them forth, and limit our discussion to our ratio decidendi.
We need not dwell on the “listings” issue, for Santiago plainly did not satisfy his
burden of showing that his impairments “meet all of the specified medical criteria. An
impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not
qualify.”  Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original).  The
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) issue is more weighty, for there is no dispute that
Santiago does not have a well or normal back, and has limitations on his ability to work. 
Central to the ALJ’s resolution of that issue was the fact that some examining physicians
considered Santiago’s orthopaedic examination “unremarkable,” found that Santiago had
normal reflexes and muscle strength, and noted the absence of muscle spasms.  Moreover,
no treating or examining physician concluded that Santiago’s condition precluded him
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of not less than
   As Judge Hochberg noted: 1
The objective medical evidence contrary to plaintiff’s subjective complaints
included the following: (1) no “physician has concluded that [Plaintiff’s]
conditions preclude him from performing any type of work activity”; (2)
“no doctor has assessed any degree of restriction involving [Plaintiff’s]
capacity for sitting or standing”; (3) Plaintiff’s examination before Dr.
deLuna showed normal reflexes “with no evidence of spasticity and normal
muscle strength”; (4) a 2000 MRI revealed “no signs of any cord
compression or impingement”; (5) a 2001 EMG revealed “no evidence of
peripheral nerve entrapment, neuropathy . . . , or . . . radiculopathy.” 
Santiago v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 03-CV-4310 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2004) (slip op. at n.4)
(alterations in original).
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twelve months.
In his RFC analysis, the ALJ described Santiago’s subjective complaints of pain
and found them “not entirely credible” because of the lack of supporting objective
medical evidence.    Contrary medical evidence can, of course, discredit a claimant’s1
subjective claims of pain.  Santiago attacks the Commissioner’s medical evidence.
However, the ALJ as the fact finder was entitled to give less weight to the reports of
certain physicians, e.g. Dr. Goyal and Dr. Brown (a chiropractor), and to rely on the
testing and reports of others, e.g. Dr. Hsu, Dr. deLuna, and Dr. Chirls (who testified at the
hearing).  
Santiago also submits that the ALJ’s finding that he retained “the residual
functional capacity to perform the exertional demands of light work” was not based on
substantial evidence.  Based upon the medical evidence, the ALJ reasoned that Santiago
retains the RFC to perform the exertional demands of light work, or work which requires
   Some light jobs are performed while standing, and those performed in the seated2
position often require the worker to operate hand or leg controls.  
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maximum lifting of twenty pounds and frequent lifting of ten pounds.   He concluded that2
Santiago retained the RFC to return to his past work, i.e., more specifically, that
Santiago’s past work did not require the performance of activities precluded by his
medically determinable impairments.  Finally, the ALJ found it clear that Santiago is
capable of performing the order filler and lead person work that he previously engaged in,
as it is performed in the national economy.  In our view, these conclusions are based on
substantial evidence in the record.  
We have considered Mr. Alter’s contention that the ALJ ignored the basic tenets of
our Cotter jurisprudence, see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, reh’g denied, 650 F.2d 481
(3d Cir. 1981), but are constrained to disagree. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
